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Abstract
In [12] we introduced the propositional modal logic CC (which stands
for Turing Schmerl Calculus) which adequately describes the provable in-
terrelations between different kinds of Turing progressions. In [13] we
defined a model J which is proven to be a universal model for CC based
on the intensively studied Ignatiev’s universal model for the closed frag-
ment of GLP (Gödel Löb’s polymodal provability logic). In the current
paper we present a new universal frame H, which is a slight modification
of J , and whose domain allows for a modal definability of each of its
worlds.
1 Introduction
Turing progressions arise by iteratedly adding consistency statements to a base
theory. Different notions of consistency give rise to different Turing progres-
sions. In [12], we introduced the system CC that generates exactly all relations
that hold between these different Turing progressions given a particular set of
natural consistency notions. The system was proven to be arithmetically sound
and complete for a natural interpretation, named the Formalized Turing pro-
gressions (FTP) interpretation. In [13], we defined a model J which is proven
to be a universal model for CC. The model J is a slight modification of the
intensively studied I : Ignatiev’s universal model for the closed fragment of
Gödel Löb’s polymodal provability logic GLP.
In the current paper we introduce a new universal model for CC based on a
minor modification of J . Ignatiev’s model and J share the same domain built
from specials sequences of ordinals. For this new frame, we shall consider only
sequences with finite support. We will prove the completeness of CC w.r.t.
∗ehermo.reyes@ub.edu
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this model and as a consequence, we shall see that every world in the frame is
modally definable.
2 The logic CC
In this section we introduce the logic CC whose main goal is to express valid
relations that hold between the corresponding Turing progressions. CC is built-
up from a positive propositional modal signature using ordinal modalities. Let
Λ be a fixed recursive ordinal throughout the paper with some properties as
specified in Remark 2.6. By ordinal modalities we denote modalities of the form
〈nα 〉 where α ∈ Λ for some fixed ordinal Λ and n ∈ ω (named exponent and
base, respectively). The set of formulas in this language is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. By F we denote the smallest set such that:
i) ⊤ ∈ F;
ii) If ϕ, ψ ∈ F⇒ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ F;
iii) if ϕ ∈ F, n < ω and α < Λ⇒ 〈nα 〉ϕ ∈ F.
For any formula ψ in this signature, we define the set of base elements
occurring in ψ. That is:
Definition 2.2. The set of base elements occurring in any modality of a formula
ψ ∈ F is denoted by N-mod(ψ). We recursively define N-mod as follows:
i) N-mod(⊤) = ∅;
ii) N-mod(ϕ ∧ ψ) = N-mod(ϕ) ∪ N-mod(ψ);
iii) N-mod(〈nα 〉ψ) = {n} ∪ N-mod(ψ).
In order to give the axioms of our system, we need to consider a kind of spe-
cial formulas named monomial normal forms. Monomial normal forms are con-
junctions of monomials with an additional condition on the occurring exponents.
In order to formulate this condition we first need to define the hyper-exponential
as studied in [9].
Definition 2.3. For every n ∈ ω the hyper-exponential functions en : On→ On
are recursively defined as follows: e0 is the identity function, e1 : α 7→ −1 + ωα
and en+m = en ◦ em.
We will use e to denote e1. Note that for α not equal to zero we have that
e(α) coincides with the regular ordinal exponentiation with base ω; that is,
α 7→ ωα. However, it turns out that hyper-exponentials have the nicer algebraic
properties in the context of provability logics.
Definition 2.4. The set of formulas in monomial normal form, MNF, is in-
ductively defined as follows:
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i) ⊤ ∈ MNF;
ii) 〈nα 〉⊤ ∈ M, for any n<ω and α<Λ;
iii) if a) 〈nα00 〉⊤ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈n
αk
k 〉⊤ ∈ MNF;
b) n < n0;
c) α of the form en0−n(α0) · (2 + δ) for some δ < Λ,
then 〈nα 〉⊤ ∧ 〈nα00 〉⊤ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈n
αk
k 〉⊤ ∈ MNF.
The derivable objects of CC are sequents i.e. expressions of the form ϕ ⊢ ψ
where ϕ, ψ ∈ F. We will use the following notation: by ϕ ≡ ψ we will denote
that both ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ ϕ are derivable. Also, by convention we take that for
any n, 〈n0 〉ϕ is just ϕ.
Definition 2.5. CC is given by the following set of axioms and rules:
Axioms:
1. ϕ ⊢ ϕ, ϕ ⊢ ⊤;
2. ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ;
3. Monotonicity axioms: 〈nα 〉ϕ ⊢ 〈nβ 〉ϕ, for β <α;
4. Co-additivity axioms: 〈nβ+α 〉ϕ ≡ 〈nα 〉〈nβ 〉ϕ;
5. Reduction axioms: 〈 (n+m)α 〉ϕ ⊢ 〈ne
m(α) 〉ϕ;
6. Schmerl axioms:
〈nα 〉
(
〈nα00 〉⊤ ∧ ψ
)
≡ 〈ne
n0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉⊤ ∧ 〈nα00 〉⊤ ∧ ψ
for n<n0 and 〈n
α0
0 〉⊤ ∧ ψ ∈ MNF.
Rules:
1. If ϕ ⊢ ψ and ϕ ⊢ χ, then ϕ ⊢ ψ ∧ χ;
2. If ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ χ, then ϕ ⊢ χ;
3. If ϕ ⊢ ψ, then 〈nα 〉ϕ ⊢ 〈nα 〉ψ ;
4. If ϕ ⊢ ψ, then 〈nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ ⊢ 〈nα 〉
(
ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ
)
for n>m.
It is worth mentioning the special character of Axioms (5) and (6) since both
axioms are modal formulations of principles related to Schmerl’s fine structure
theorem, also known as Schmerl’s formulas (see [16] and [3]).
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Remark 2.6. As we see in the axioms of our logic, they only make sense if the
ordinals occuring in them are available. Recall that Λ is fixed to be a recursive
ordinal all through the paper. Moreover, some usable closure conditions on Λ
naturally suggest themselves. Since it suffices to require that for n < ω that
α, β < Λ ⇒ α + en(β) < Λ, we shall for the remainder assume that Λ is an
ε-number, that is, a positive fixpoint of e whence e(Λ) = Λ = ωΛ.
In [12], the authors proved that for any formula ϕ, there is a unique equiv-
alent ψ in monomial normal form.
Theorem 2.7. For every formula ϕ there is a unique ψ ∈MNF such that ϕ ≡ ψ.
In virtue of the Reduction axioms, a formula ψ ∈ MNF may bear implicit
information on monomials 〈nα 〉⊤ for n 6∈ N-mod(ψ). The next definition is
made to retrieve this information.
Definition 2.8. Let ψ := 〈nα00 〉⊤∧ . . .∧〈n
αk
k 〉⊤ ∈ MNF. By πni(ψ) we denote
the corresponding exponent αi. Moreover, for m 6∈ N-mod(ψ), with nk > m,
πm(ψ) is set to be e
(
πm+1(ψ)
)
and for m′ > nk, πm′(ψ) is defined to be 0.
Another important result in [12] is the decidability of the sequents entailing
formulas in monomial normal form:
Theorem 2.9. For any ψ0, ψ1 ∈ MNF, where ψ0 := 〈n
α0
0 〉⊤ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈n
αk
k 〉⊤
and ψ1 := 〈m
β0
0 〉⊤ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈m
βj
j 〉⊤. We have that ψ0 ⊢ ψ1 iff for any n < ω,
πn(ψ0) ≥ πn(ψ1).
3 A universal model for CC
In [13] we defined a modal model J which is universal for CC. That is, any
derivable sequent holds everywhere in the model whereas any non-derivable se-
quent is refuted somewhere in the model. This section summarizes the results
in that paper.
As Ignatiev’s frame, this model is based on specials sequences of ordinals.
In order to define them, we need the following central definition.
Definition 3.1. We define ordinal logarithm as ℓ(0) := 0 and ℓ(α+ ωβ) := β.
With this last definition we are now ready to introduce the set of worlds of
our frame.
Definition 3.2. By Igω we denote the set of ℓ-sequences or Ignatiev sequences.
That is, the set of sequences x := 〈x0, x1, x2, . . . 〉 where for i <ω, xi+1 ≤ ℓ(xi).
Next, we can define our frame, which is a minor variation of Ignatiev’s frame.
Definition 3.3. JΛ := 〈 I, {Rn}n<ω 〉 is defined as follows:
I := {x∈ Igω : xi<Λ for i <ω}
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and
xRny :⇔ (∀m ≤ n xm>ym ∧ ∀ i >n xi ≥ yi).
Since Λ is a fixed ordinal along the paper, from now on we suppress the
subindex Λ.
We define the auxiliary relations Rαn for any n < ω and α < Λ. The idea is
that the Rαn will model the 〈n
α 〉 modality.
Definition 3.4. Given x, y ∈ I and Rn on I, we recursively define xR
α
ny as
follows:
1. xR0ny :⇔ x = y;
2. xR1+αn y :⇔ ∀β<1+α ∃z
(
xRnz ∧ zRβny
)
.
With the the auxiliary relations Rαn , we can define the validity of a formula
ϕ in a point x ∈ I.
Definition 3.5. Let x ∈ I and ϕ ∈ F. By x  ϕ we denote the validity of ϕ in
x that is recursively defined as follows:
• x  ⊤ for all x ∈ I;
• x  ϕ ∧ ψ iff x  ϕ and x  ψ;
• x  〈nα 〉ϕ iff there is y ∈ I, xRαny and y  ϕ.
The following theorem establishes the completeness of CC.
Theorem 3.6. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ F, we have that:
ϕ ⊢ ψ ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ I
(
J , x  ϕ =⇒ J , x  ψ
)
.
3.1 Ignatiev sequences and MNF’s
In this subsection we shall define a translation between formulas in formulas in
monomial normal form and Ignatiev sequences.
Definition 3.7. Let ψ := 〈nα00 〉⊤ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈n
αk
k 〉⊤ ∈ MNF. By xψ we denote
the sequence 〈πi(ψ) 〉i<ω.
In virtue of Definition 2.8, we can observe that for ψ ∈ MNF, we have that
xψ ∈ I.
The following results establish the relation between this translation and the
validity in J :
Lemma 3.8. For any ϕ ∈ MNF, J , xϕ  ϕ.
Lemma 3.9. Given ϕ, ψ ∈ MNF, if ϕ 6⊢ ψ then J , xϕ  ϕ and J , xϕ 6 ψ.
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4 A finitely supported variation on J
For Λ > ε0 it might happen that a ℓ-sequence x never reach zero, getting stabi-
lized at some ε-number. For instance, the sequence 〈 ε0, ε0, ε0, . . . 〉 ∈ Ig
ω but
since ε0 is a fixpoint of ordinal exponentiation with base ω, that is, ωε0 = ε0,
this sequence will not converge to zero.
Given a ℓ-sequence x, if all but finitely many of its elements are zero, we
will write 〈x0, . . . , xn,~0 〉 to denote such ℓ-sequence or even simply 〈x0, . . . , xn 〉
whenever xn+1 = 0. We shall refer to such sequences as finitely supported se-
quences or sequences with finite support. In [13], we showed that only sequences
with finite support are modally definable.
The purpose of this new universal frame is to give a model where every
world is modally definable. Thus, the set of worlds of our frame is going to
be built from these finitely supported sequences whose ordinals are less than Λ.
Thereby, the domain of our frame is a subset of I. With respect to the relations,
we maintain the same definition that we introduced for the relations in J .
Definition 4.1. HΛ := 〈H, {Sn}n<ω 〉 is defined as follows:
H := {x∈ Igω : ∀ i <ω xi<Λ ∧ ∃ j <ω xj = 0 }
and
xSny :⇔ (∀m ≤ n xm>ym ∧ ∀ i >n xi ≥ yi).
As before, since Λ is a fixed ordinal along the paper, from now on we suppress
the subindex Λ.
Remark 4.2. Since we have that H ⊂ I and we preserve the same definition
for the Sn relations, clearly for any x, y ∈ H, we have that xSny ⇐⇒ xRny.
Moreover, if x ∈ H and xRny for some y ∈ I, then y ∈ H and xSny.
We can make some simple observations on the relations Sn.
Lemma 4.3.
1. Each Sn for n ∈ ω is transitive: xSny ySnz ⇒ xSz;
2. Each Sn for n ∈ ω is Noetherian: each non-empty X ⊆ H has an Sn-
maximal element y ∈ X, i.e., ∀x∈X ¬ySnx;
3. The relations Sn are monotone in n in the sense that: xSny ⇒ xSmy
whenever n > m.
As we did for J , we need to define the auxiliary relations Sαn for any n < ω
and α < Λ whose purpose is to model the 〈nα 〉 modality.
Definition 4.4. Given x, y ∈ H and Sn on H, we recursively define xSαny as
follows:
1. xS0ny :⇔ x = y;
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2. xS1+αn y :⇔ ∀β<1+α ∃z
(
xSnz ∧ zSβny
)
.
With the the auxiliary relations Sαn , we give the following definition for a
formula ϕ being true in a point x of H.
Definition 4.5. Let x ∈ H and ϕ ∈ F. By x  ϕ we denote the validity of ϕ
in x that is recursively defined as follows:
• x  ⊤ for all x ∈ H;
• x  ϕ ∧ ψ iff x  ϕ and x  ψ;
• x  〈nα 〉ϕ iff there is y ∈ H, xSαny and y  ϕ.
The following result was proven in [13] for the relations Rα+1n defined over
J . The same result holds if we restrict ourselves to elements in H and thus, it
can be easily applied to the Sα+1n relations.
Proposition 4.6. Given x, y ∈ H, n < ω and α < Λ:
1. xRα+1n y ⇐⇒ ∃z ∈ H
(
xRnz ∧ zRαny
)
;
2. xSα+1n y ⇐⇒ ∃z
(
xSnz ∧ zSαny
)
.
Proof. We proceed by making a case distinction on α. For α = 0 both items
are straightforward. For α > 0, we start by proving left-to-right implication of
Item 1. Assume xRα+1n y. By Definition 3.4, ∀β < α + 1 ∃z
(
xRnz ∧ zRβny
)
.
Since x ∈ H and xRnz, then z ∈ H . Therefore, in particular we have that ∃z ∈
H
(
xRnz ∧ zRαny
)
. For the other direction, assume ∃z ∈ H
(
xRnz ∧ zRαny
)
.
Thus, ∃z ∈ H
(
xRnz ∧ zRαny
)
and ∀β < α ∃u
(
zRnu ∧ uRβny
)
. Hence, we
get that ∀β < α + 1 ∃z
(
xRnz ∧ zRβny
)
i.e. xRα+1n y. The proof of Item 2 is
analogous.
The following proposition establishes the preservation between the Sαn rela-
tions of H and the Rαn relations of J when restricted to the elements in H .
Proposition 4.7. For any x, y ∈ H, n < ω and α < Λ:
xSαny ⇐⇒ xR
α
ny.
Proof. We proceed by induction on α. For α = 0 is trivial. For α = β + 1,
assume xSβ+1n y and reason as follows:
xSβ+1n y ⇐⇒ ∃z
(
xSnz ∧ zSβny
)
by Lemma 4.6, Item 1;
⇐⇒ ∃z ∈ H
(
xRnz ∧ zRβny
)
by Remark 4.2 and the I.H.;
⇐⇒ xSβ+1n y by Lemma 4.6, Item 1.
For α = λ ∈ Lim we reason analogously applying the I.H. and Remark 4.2.
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5 Preservation of validity
To prove the completeness of CC w.r.t. H, first we shall prove the preservation
of validity between frames H and J when restricted to ℓ-sequences with finite
support.
Theorem 5.1. For any x ∈ H and ϕ ∈ F,
J , x  ϕ ⇐⇒ H, x  ϕ.
Proof. Proof goes by induction on ϕ. Base and conjunctive cases are straight-
forward. For the case ϕ := 〈nα 〉ψ, assume J , x  〈nα 〉ψ. Thus, there is
y ∈ I such that xRαny and J , y  ψ. By Remark 4.2, we know y ∈ H and by
Proposition 4.7 we have that xSαny. This combine with the I.H. gives us that
there is y ∈ H such that xSαny and H, y  ψ, that is, H, x  〈n
α 〉ψ. For the
other implication, suppose that H, x  〈nα 〉ψ i.e. there is y ∈ H such that
xSαny and H, y  ψ. By Remark 4.2, we know H ⊂ I. Thus, by Proposition
4.7 and the I.H. we obtain that y ∈ I such that xRαny and J , y  ψ and so,
J , x  〈nα 〉ψ.
Now we can show the completeness of our system w.r.t. H.
Theorem 5.2. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ F, we have that:
ϕ ⊢ ψ ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ H
(
H, x  ϕ =⇒ H, x  ψ
)
.
Proof. For the left-to-right implication, assume ϕ ⊢ ψ. Thus, by Theorem 3.6:
∀x ∈ I
(
J , x  ϕ =⇒ J , x  ψ
)
. (1)
Assume H, x  ϕ for some x ∈ H . Then, by Theorem 5.1, J , x  ϕ and by
(1), J , x  ψ. Hence, by Theorem 5.1, H, x  ψ.
For the other implication, reasoning by contrapositive, assume ϕ 6⊢ ψ. Thus,
by Lemma 3.9, we have the following:
J , xϕ  ϕ & J , xϕ 6 ψ. (2)
We can observe that by definitions 3.7 and 2.8, xϕ is a ℓ-sequence with finite
support. Thus, xϕ ∈ H . Hence, by means of Theorem 5.1 together with (2), we
obtain that H, xϕ  ϕ but H, xϕ 6 ψ which concludes the proof.
6 Modal definability
In this section we shall see an application of the completeness of CC w.r.t H.
As pointed by some results established in [13], finitely supported sequences are
modally definable, which makes every world in H modally definable in the sense
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of Theorem 6.3.
First, we will check some facts that relate monomial normal forms and ℓ-
sequences with finite support.
Lemma 6.1. Let x ∈ H. There is a unique ψ ∈ MNF such that xψ = x.
Proof. Let x := 〈x0, . . . , xm, 0 〉 ∈ H and consider the map M : H → MNF
defined as follows:
1. M(〈 0 〉) = ⊤;
2. M(〈α, 0 〉) = 〈 0α 〉⊤;
3. M(〈α0, . . . , αj+1, 0 〉) =
{
M(〈α1, . . . , αj+1, 0 〉) if α0 = e(α1);
〈 0α0 〉⊤ ∧ M(〈α1, . . . , αj+1, 0 〉) if α0 > e(α1).
By Definition 3.7, we can easily check that xM(x) = x.
With the following auxiliary definition we are ready to introduce the main
theorem of this section about the modal definability of the worlds in H.
Definition 6.2. Let x ∈ H. By x↓ we denote the subset of H such that y ∈ x↓
iff yj < xj for some j < ω.
Theorem 6.3. For any x ∈ H there is ϕ ∈ F such that:
H, x  ϕ & ∀ y ∈ x↓, H, y 6 ϕ.
Proof. By a combination of Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 3.8 we obtain that for
every x ∈ H , we have that H, x  M(x). Moreover, by Theorem 2.9, we have
that for any y ∈ x↓, M(y) 6⊢ M(x). Hence, by Lemma 3.9 and Theorem 5.1,
H, yM(y) 6 M(x) i.e. H, y 6 M(x).
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